the subject's environment. The thesis opens up the possibility that a subject's mental state and event kinds might vary with variations in the subject's environment, even while her physical properties, including her functional properties and her physical history, all individualistically and non-intentionally described, remain constant. Hence psychological externalism opens up the possibility that physically indistinguishable subjects could nevertheless be distinguishable psychologically.
In this paper I will examine one argument against natural kind externalism. However, my interest is not primarily either with the particular argument, or even with the defence of externalism against it. Rather, I am concerned to show that reflection on the general form of the argument brings to light a surprising and important fact about supervenience, namely that subvenient bases must be construed as involving absences. This fact serves, of course, to undermine the particular argument against natural kind externalism I deal with.
Let me begin with the following pressing question: What is the externalist to say about apparent natural kind terms that fail to refer, such as 'phlogiston' and 'ether'? The problem becomes apparent when we consider physical duplicates one of whom has a concept that refers to a natural kind, 2 and the other of whom lives in a world where there is no plausible such natural kind to which any putative twin concept might refer. Consider the following example taken from Paul Boghossian (1997) . We are to suppose that there is a planet, Dry Earth, similar to Earth in all respects in which Twin Earth and Earth are similar to one another, but which differs from both in that, although it very much seems to its inhabitants that there is a clear, tasteless and colourless liquid flowing in their rivers and taps and to which they confidently take themselves to be applying the word 'water', these appearances are systematically false and constitute a sort of pervasive collective mirage. In point of actual fact, the lakes, rivers and taps on this particular Twin Earth run bone dry. Segal's reason for thinking the first horn of the dilemma unacceptable is this. To maintain that the term 'water' as used on Dry Earth fails to express a concept is to give up the claim that we can make psychological sense of the subjects on Dry Earth who use that term. More broadly speaking, 'the main argument for attributing empty concepts … is simply that by so doing, and only by so doing, can we make psychological sense of a wide variety of human activity and cognition' (Segal 2000: 37) . I will not dwell on this horn of the dilemma. Indeed I agree that it is implausible to maintain that our empty terms simply fail to express concepts. We appear to understand sentences containing them; we appear to communicate by means of such sentences; we successfully predict and explain the behaviour of others on the assumption that such sentences express thoughts. At the very least there is an overwhelming presumption in favour of the view that empty terms nevertheless often express concepts.
2 I leave this issue to one side here. The form of argument I wish to focus on underlies, rather, Segal's reason for thinking the second horn of the dilemma unacceptable. Why, then, does Segal think it unacceptable for the externalist to maintain that 'water' as used on Dry Earth expresses a concept the extension of which is empty?
Segal writes, 1 Boghossian (1997) also uses the empty case to argue against externalism, although his argument takes a slightly different tack which I will not discuss here.
2 I say 'often' since there may be cases in which the best explanation of a situation dictates that a subject really does express no concept by a given word she uses. Segal's claim here is that once we allow that 'water' on Dry Earth expresses a concept, there is every reason to think it will express the same concept as is expressed by 'water' on Earth, which must then be construed as worldindependent, and hence individualistic. We are assuming that empty terms express empty concepts. What Segal tries to show is that the concept C1 possessed by S1 on Earth, and the concept C2 possessed by S2 on Dry Earth, are identical. This would undermine the externalist claim that natural kind concepts were world-dependent. Segal's argument, then, proceeds as follows. 3 The externalist accepts that psychological properties supervene on something else. After all, externalists are typically committed to the global nomological supervenience of psychological properties on physical properties. From this it follows that there is some minimal set of physical properties which suffice for a subject's possessing a concept. Segal's claim is that the minimal set of physical properties sufficient for S2's possession of C2 on 3 Segal in fact provides three arguments for the claim that the existence of empty concepts tells against natural kind externalism. I do not deal with the first of these, which appeals to considerations of sameness of causal role. The second is presented in the text. The third is structurally similar to the second, and the same objection can be raised against it.
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Dry Earth is also present on Earth, and hence would suffice for S1's possession of the concept C2. Since by assumption S1 possesses the concept C1, C2 and C1 must be identical. The same considerations underlie a variant argument Segal offers, the only difference being that the supervenience base is considered diachronically as opposed to synchronically, which allows acquisition conditions to be taken into account. 4 Essentially the same form of argument has also been used independently by Segal (1989) and Harold Noonan (1986 Noonan ( , 1991 Noonan ( , and 1993 against the 'strong singular thought theory' as advocated by Gareth Evans (1982 ) and John McDowell (1977 , 1984 concept by his use of the word 'water', and that everything in S2's world is present in S1's world, we are not entitled to infer that S1 possesses the same concept as S2. This is because the absence of water from S2's environment is itself a relevant factor.
It might sound strange to think of an absence as being able to contribute to the conditions sufficient for the instantiation of a property. However, and this is the surprising fact alluded to above, it is a general truth that sufficient conditions for the instantiation of a property must involve absences. This is not an ad hoc move on the part of the externalist. I will return shortly to the psychological case. For the moment, here is an argument which is obviously unsound, but which is analogous to that offered by Segal. Corundum is a mineral with chemical constitution Al 2 O 3 .
In its pure form corundum is completely colourless. However, both rubies and sapphires are derived from corundum and consequently share the same chemical constitution: Al 2 O 3 . The difference between pure corundum, rubies, and sapphires is dependent solely on the presence, or absence, of certain kinds of impurities. Thus a ruby may contain less than 1% chromium, resulting in its distinctive red colour. Similarly, a sapphire may contain traces of titanium and iron, resulting in its being blue. Now suppose there is a minimal set of physical properties sufficient for the instantiation of the property being pure corundum. On Segal's construal of minimal sets of physical properties, any situation in which this set is duplicated is a situation in which the property being pure corundum is instantiated.
subject's possession of the concept water. Other conditions would have to obtain, such as the subject's capacity for conceptual cognitive activity, causal interaction with water, and more besides.
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Consequently, if Segal's argument were sound we should have to conclude that rubies are pure corundum, and similarly that sapphires are pure corundum. After all, the minimal set of physical properties sufficient for the instantiation of the property being pure corundum would not be allowed to include the absence of impurities, and would hence be duplicated both when the property being a ruby and when the property being a sapphire is instantiated. By the transitivity of identity we should also, it would seem, have to conclude that rubies were sapphires.
One possibility would be to conclude that there is no minimal set of physical conditions sufficient for the instantiation of the property being pure corundum. This would, however, be an extreme and implausible position to take. The analogous position for psychological properties would, I think, be equally implausible; certainly it would not be conducive to the individualist, since it would entail a denial of even global supervenience.
The only alternative is to allow that the absence of certain conditions can, and often will, itself form part of the minimal set of physically sufficient conditions for the instantiation of a given property. The minimal set of physical conditions that forms the subvenient base for the property of being pure corundum includes the condition that certain impurities not be present.
Similarly, the minimal set of physical conditions that forms the subvenience base for possessing C2 includes the condition that water, twin water, and so on, not be present. Before closing I will briefly address two potential objections to my argument. The first concerns the particular example on which my claim turns, as follows. 6 The kind ruby, and the kind sapphire are both varieties of the kind corundum. Given this fact, it might be reasonable to conclude that sapphires and rubies are indeed simply instances of pure corundum.
However, this objection depends upon a particular micro-reductive theory of kinds which I take to be independently implausible. In conclusion, minimal sets of sufficient conditions involve absences.
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